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Abstract
In this paper1 from 2009 we study IL(PRA), the interpretability logic
of PRA. As PRA is neither an essentially reflexive theory nor finitely
axiomatizable, the two known arithmetical completeness results do not
apply to PRA: IL(PRA) is not ILM or ILP. IL(PRA) does of course
contain all the principles known to be part of IL(All), the interpretability
logic of the principles common to all reasonable arithmetical theories. In
this paper, we take two arithmetical properties of PRA and see what
their consequences in the modal logic IL(PRA) are. These properties
are reflected in the so-called Beklemishev Principle B, and Zambella’s
Principle Z, neither of which is a part of IL(All). Both principles and their
interrelation are submitted to a modal study. In particular, we prove a
frame condition for B. Moreover, we prove that Z follows from a restricted
form of B. Finally, we give an overview of the known relationships of
IL(PRA) to important other interpetability principles.
1 Introduction
The notion of a relativized interpretation occurs in many places in mathematics
and in mathematical logic. If a theory T interprets a theory S, we shall write
T ✄ S, which then, roughly, means that there is a translation ·t from symbols
in the language of S to formulas in the language of T such that any theorem of
S becomes a theorem of T under the canonical extension of this translation to
formulas. In the notion of interpretation that we are interested in, the logical
structure of formulas has to be preserved under the translation. Thus, for
example, (ϕ ∨ ψ)t = ϕt ∨ ψt and in particular ⊥t = (∨∅)
t = ∨∅ = ⊥. We refer
the reader to [17], [5] and [15] for precise definitions and examples.
In this paper, we shall not go much into the technical details of interpre-
tations. Rather, we are interested in the structural behavior of this notion of
interpretability. In particular, we are interested in the structural behavior of
1We thank Lev Beklemishev for his help and suggestions. Evan Goris did a thorough
proofread of an early draft and suggested a simplification of the notion of B-simulation. We
thank Albert Visser for fruitful discussions and challenges. We also thank Franco Montagna
for his many contributions to the subject. Two unknown referees improved our paper con-
siderably with their remarks and suggestions. Supported by grants GA CR 401/06/0387 and
IAA900090703.
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interpretability on sentential extensions of a certain base theory T . An easy
example of such a structural property is the transitivity of interpretations:
(T + α✄ T + β) ∧ (T + β ✄ T + γ)→ (T + α✄ T + γ).
We can use so-called interpretability logics to capture, in a sense, the complete
structural behavior of interpretability between sentential extensions of a certain
base theory. We shall soon say a bit more on this. For now it is important to
note that for a large collection of theories, the interpretability logic is known.
We call a theory reflexive if it proves the consistency of any of its finite
sub-theories (as sets of axioms). We call a theory essentially reflexive if any
finite sentential extension of it is reflexive. It is easy to see that any theory
with full induction, like Peano Arithmetic, is essentially reflexive. The inter-
pretability logic of essentially reflexive theories was determined independently
by Berarducci and Shavrukov ([4], [13]). We shall encounter this logic below
under the name of ILM. The principle (A ✄ B) → (A ∧ ✷C ✄ B ∧ ✷C) which
is the particular feature of this system. It is called Montagna’s principle since
it arose during the original discussions between Franco Montagna and Albert
Visser about the modal principles underlying interpetability logic. It was known
to Lindstro¨m and Sˇvejdar in arithmetic disguise before.
It turns out that theories which are finitely axiomatizable and which contain
a sufficient amount of arithmetic, have a different interpretability logic which is
called ILP. In [17], the first proof was given.
For no theory that is neither finitely axiomatizable nor essentially reflexive,
the interpretability logic is known. PRA is one such theory. In this paper, we
shall make some first attempts to work out the interpretability logic of PRA.
As such, this paper also fits into a larger project. As pointed out above, dif-
ferent arithmetical theories have different interpretability logics. A question that
is open since a long time concerns the logic of the core principles that pertain to
all reasonable arithmetical theories - IL(All). As PRA is certainly a ‘reasonable
arithmetical theory’, this core logic should also be a part of IL(PRA). In this
paper we shall not focus too much on the principles in the core logic. Rather
shall we consider the interpretability behavior of PRA that is typical for this
theory.
One such principle that is characteristic for PRA is Beklemishev’s principle
that shall be studied closely in this paper. This principle exploits the fact that
any theory which is an extension of PRA by Σ2 sentences is reflexive. We
give a characterization of this principle in terms of the modal semantics for
interpretability logics.
A topic that is closely related to interpretability logics, is that of Π1-conservativity
logics. A theory S is Π1 conservative over a theory T in the same language of
arithmetic, we shall write S ✄Π1 T whenever S proves any Π1 theorem that is
proven by T . In symbols: T ⊢ π =⇒ S ⊢ π for any π ∈ Π1. It is easy to see that
for any Σ1 sentence σ, the following is a valid principle S✄Π1T → S+σ✄Π1T+σ.
This principle is the basis for Montagna’s principle for interpretability logic, and
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Beklemishev’s principle which is studied in this paper is a restriction of Mon-
tagna’s principle.
When T and S are both reflexive theories we have that S ✄ T ↔ S ✄Π1 T .
This equivalence was exploited by Ha´jek and Montagna who were the first to
show that the Π1-conservativity logic of PA is ILM as well [9]. The observation
about the equivalence is more generally important when looking at the repercus-
sions of Π1-conservativity principles on interpretability logics. In this paper we
shall consider Zambella’s principle for Π1-conservativity logics and look at its
repercussions for the interpretability logic of PRA. We shall show that Zambella
does not add new information in the sense that its modal-logical consequences
are already implied by Beklemishev’s principle.
It is remarkable that the notion of interpretability is, in a sense, less stable
than that of Π1-conservativity. Ha´jek and Montagna show that their results
extends to all reasonable theories containing IΣ1. This was strengthened by
Beklemishev and Visser in [3]: all theories extending the parameter-free in-
duction schema IΠ−1 have the same Π1-conservativity logic (ILM) whereas in
this range the interpretability logics expose a diverse and wild behavior. Note
though that PRA does not prove IΠ−1 , and, in fact, the Π1-conservativity logic
of PRA remains unknown.
A number of the results in this paper was first proved in [10].
2 Arithmetic
Let us first fix some arithmetical notation. We use modal symbols ✷,✸,✄ both
in modal and arithmetical statements, here we fix their arithmetical meaning.
We write, for an arithmetical sentence α, ✷Tα for formalized provability in
T, ✷T,nα for formalized provability of α in T using only non-logical axioms
with Go¨del numbers ≤ n and formulas of logical complexity ≤ n 2. Dually,
✸Tα = ¬✷T¬α means formalized consistency of α over T (i.e. nonexistence of
a proof of a contradiction from α), while ✸T,nα means ¬✷T,n¬α. For theories
T, S we use T✄S to denote formalized interpretability of S in T. For arithmetical
sentences α, β, α ✄T β means T + α ✄ T + β. Similarly for theories T, S, ✄Π1
denotes formalized Π1-conservativity of T over S and for arithmetical sentences
α, β, α✄Π1 β means T + α✄Π1 T+ β.
2.1 What is PRA?
In the literature there are many definitions of PRA. Probably the best known
definition uses a language that contains a function symbol for every primitive re-
cursive function. The axioms contain the defining equations of these functions.
Moreover, there are induction axioms for each ∆0-formula in this enriched lan-
guage.
2Since PRA proves superexponentiation this is, in the case under study, equivalent to the
restriction of axioms to those ≤ n
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Beklemishev has shown in [2] that PRA is in a strong sense equivalent (faith-
fully mutually interpretable) with (EA)2ω . Here, (EA)
2
ω is the theory that is
obtained by starting with EA (= I∆0 + exp) and iterating ‘ω many times’ Π2-
reflection. In symbols: (EA)20 = EA, and (EA)
2
n+1 = RFN(EA)2n(Π2).
In this paper, we shall use the definition:
PRA := (EA)2ω.
Under this definition, the following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 2.1. Any r.e. extension of PRA by Σ02 sentences is reflexive.
2.2 The Orey-Ha´jek Characterizations
All theories that are mentioned here are supposed to be consistent and have
a poly-time recognizable axiomatization. Orey and Ha´jek have given several
equivalent conditions on theories which express that the one interprets the other.
In this subsection we shall briefly mention the one we shall need and refer to
the literature for proofs.
Lemma 2.2. Whenever T is reflexive we have that
T ✄ S ⇔ ∀x T ⊢ ¬✷S,x⊥
Moreover in the presence of the totality of exponentiation this equivalence can
be formalized.
⊢ T ✄ S ↔ ∀x ✷T¬✷S,x⊥
In [10] an overview is given of all the implications, corresponding require-
ments and necessary arguments regarding Orey-Ha´jek. In the above Lemma the
⇐ does not need the requirement of reflexivity and can actually be formalized
in S12. For the other direction reflexivity is needed, and for its formalization,
the totality of exp as well.
Note that, using the above characterization, the prima facie Σ3 notion of
interpretability becomes Π2.
3 Modal logics and semantics
Similarly as formalized provability can be captured by modal provability logic,
we can use modal logic to reason about formalized interpretability. Modal logic
proved to be an extremely useful tool to reason about such formalized phenom-
ena since it can visualize their behaviour using a simple language and an intuitive
frame semantics. Perhaps the most significant point where modal logic shows
its skills are completeness proofs - arithmatical completeness proofs are based
on modal completeness proofs obtained by rather standard method of model
theory of modal logics. For more on material contained in this section we refer
to [17, 10, 8].
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We will work with modal propositional language containing two modalities -
a unary ✷ modality for provability and a binary ✄ modality for interpretability.
Modal interpretability formulas are defined as follows:
A ::= p | ⊥ | (A∧A) | (A → A) | (✷A) | (A ✄A)
We will use standard abbreviations ✸,∨,¬,⊤,↔, and we write A ≡ B in-
stead of (A✄B)∧(B✄A). We shall often omit brackets writing formulas. We say
that ¬,✷, and ✸ bind equally strong, they bind stronger then equally strong
binding ∨ and ∧ which in turn bind stronger then ✄. The weakest binding
connectives are → and ↔.
An arithmetical interpretation of modal formulas is given by arithmetical
realizations : for an arithmetical theory T, an arithmetical T-realization is a map
∗ sending propositional variables p to arithmetical sentences p∗. It is extended
to interpretability modal formulas as follows: first ∗ commutes with all boolean
connectives. Moreover (✷A)∗ = ✷TA
∗ and (A ✄ B)∗ = A∗ ✄T B
∗, i.e. ∗
translates modal operators to formalized provability and interpretability over T
respectively.
An interpretability principle of an arithmetical theory T is a modal formula
A such that ∀∗T ⊢ A∗. The interpretability logic of a theory T, denoted IL(T),
is then the set of all the interpretability principles of T.
3.1 The logic IL
The logic IL is in a sense the core interpretability logic - it is a (proper) part of
the interpretability logic of any reasonable arithmetical theory: IL ⊂ IL(T). It
captures the basic structural behaviour of interpretability.
IL is defined as the smallest set of formulas containing all propositional
tautologies, all instantiations of the following schemata, and is closed under the
Necessitation and Modus Ponens rules:
L1 ✷(A→ B)→ (✷A→ ✷B)
L2 ✷A→ ✷✷A
L3 ✷(✷A→ A)→ ✷A
J1 ✷(A→ B)→ A✄B
J2 (A✄B) ∧ (B ✄ C)→ A✄ C
J3 (A✄ C) ∧ (B ✄ C)→ A ∨B ✄ C
J4 A✄B → (✸A→ ✸B)
J5 ✸A✄A
Note that the part of IL not containing the ✄ modality is the well-known
Go¨del-Lo¨b provability logic GL, axiomatized by the first three schemata. It is
easy to show that ✷ can be defined in terms of ✄ modality: ⊢IL ✷A↔ ¬A✄⊥.
More interpretability logics are obtained extending IL by new interpretabil-
ity principles. Some of such principles are listed below:
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W A✄B → A✄B ∧ ✷¬A
W∗ A✄B → B ∧✷C ✄B ∧ ✷C ∧ ✷¬A
M0 A✄B → ✸A ∧✷C ✄B ∧✷C
M A✄B → A ∧ ✷C ✄B ∧ ✷C
P A✄B → ✷(A✄B)
R A✄B → ¬(A✄ ¬C) ✄B ∧ ✷C
R∗ A✄B → ¬(A✄ ¬C) ✄B ∧ ✷C ∧ ✷¬A
All of these principles are in IL(All) except the principles M and P which
were mentioned above already. For an overview, see [17] and [8]. For the last
word on IL(All) see [11].
For X a set of principles we denote ILX the logic extending IL with schemata
from X.
There are some results considering arithmetical completeness of interpretabil-
ity logics: it was shown in [4],[13] that the interpretability logic of an essentially
reflexive theory (as e.g. PA) is ILM. For finitely axiomatizable theories con-
taining supexp the interpretability logic is known to be ILP ([16]).
An important consequence of ILM that expresses the Π1-conservativity of
interpretability more directly is (A✄✸B)→ ✷(A→ ✸B).
3.2 Modal semantics
Modal frame semantics of interpretability logics is based on GL-frames ex-
tended with a ternary accesibility relation interpreting the binary ✄ modality.
The ternary relation is however given by a set of binary relations indexed by
the nodes:
Definition 3.1. An IL-frame (a Veltman frame) is a triple 〈W,R, S〉 where W
is a nonempty universe, R is a binary relation on W , and S is a set of binary
relations on W , indexed by elements of W such that
1. R is transitive and conversely well-founded
2. ySxz ⇒ xRy& xRz
3. xRy ⇒ ySxy
4. xRyRz ⇒ ySxz
5. uSxvSxw⇒ uSxw
An IL-model is a quadruple 〈W,R, S,〉 where 〈W,R, S〉 is a IL-frame and
 is a subset of W ×Prop, extending to boolean formulas as usualy and to modal
formulas as follows:
w  ✷A iff ∀v(wRv ⇒ v  A)
w  A✄B iff ∀u(wRu & u  A⇒ ∃v(uSwv  B))
We adopt standard definitions of validity of a modal formula in a model and
in a frame. Moreover, let X be a scheme of interpretability logic. We say that
6
a formula C in first or higher order logic is a frame condition for X if, for each
frame F ,
F |= C iffF |= X.
Let us list some known frame conditions (to be read universally quantified):
M xRySxzRu⇒ yRu
M0 xRyRzSxuRv ⇒ yRv
P xRyRzSxu⇒ yRu ∧ zSyu
W (Sw;R) is conversely well-founded
R xRyRzSxuRv ⇒ zSyv
We have the following completeness results: IL is sound and complete w.r.t.
(finite) IL frames, ILP is complete w.r.t. (finite) ILP frames (all in [6]), ILW
is complete w.r.t. (finite) ILW frames ([7], see also [8]), ILM is complete w.r.t.
(finite) ILM frames (in [6], also in [4]),
4 Beklemishev’s principle
It is possible to write down a valid principle specific for the interpretability logic
of PRA. This was first done by Beklemishev (see [17]). Beklemishev’s principle
B exploits the fact that any finite Σ2-extension of PRA is reflexive, together with
the fact that we have a good Orey-Ha´jek characterization for reflexive theories.
It turns out to be possible to define a class of modal formulae which are under
any arithmetical realization provably Σ2 in PRA. These are called essentially
Σ2-formulas, we write ES2. Let us start by defining this class and some related
classes.
The idea behind this definition is as follows. It is clear that each modal
formula that starts with a ✷ will become under any arithmetical realization a
Σ1 formula. Likewise, taking Lemma 2 into account, we see that any formula
of the form A✄ B where A is Σ2, will be under any arithmetical realization of
complexity Π2 and hence, ¬(A✄B) will again be Σ2. Note that we are here only
formulating sufficient conditions. It turns out to be rather tough to show these
classes actually cover, up to provable equivalence, all formulae in the intended
complexity class.
The class BS1 denotes the formulae that are boolean combinations of Σ1
formulae ad thus certainly ∆2. Likewise, ES3 and ES4, stands for those modal
formulae that are under any arithmetical realization always Σ3 or Σ4 respec-
tively.
In our definition, A will stand for the set of all modal interpretability for-
mulae.
BS1 ::= ✷A | ¬BS1 | BS1 ∧ BS1 | BS1 ∨ BS1
ES2 ::= ✷A | ¬✷A | ES2 ∧ ES2 | ES2 ∨ ES2 | ¬(ES2 ✄A)
ES3 ::= ✷A | ¬✷A | ES3 ∧ ES3 | ES3 ∨ ES3 | A✄A
ES4 ::= ✷A | ¬ES4 | ES4 ∧ ES4 | ES4 ∨ ES4 | A✄A
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For n ≥ 4 we set ESn := ES4. We can now formulate Beklemishev’s principle B.
B := A✄B → A ∧ ✷C ✄B ∧ ✷C for A ∈ ES2
Note that B is just Montagna’s principle M restricted to ES2-formulas.
Lemma 4.1. ILB ⊢ B′, where B′ : A✄B → A ∧ C ✄B ∧C with A ∈ ES2 and
C a CNF (a conjunction of disjunctions) of boxed formulas.
Proof. Easy.
5 Arithmetical soundness of B
By Lemma 2.1 we know that PRA+σ is reflexive for any Σ2(PRA)-sentence σ.
Thus, we get by Orey-Ha´jek that
PRA ⊢ σ ✄PRA ψ ↔ ∀x ✷PRA(σ → ✸PRA,xψ). (1)
Consequently, for σ ∈ Σ2(PRA), ¬(σ ✄PRA ψ) ∈ Σ2(PRA) and we see that,
indeed, ∀A∈ES2 ∀ ∗ A
∗ ∈ Σ2(PRA). This enables us to prove the arithmetical
soundness of B.
Theorem 5.1. For any formulas B and C we have that ∀A∈ES2 ∀ ∗ PRA ⊢
(A✄B → A ∧ ✷C ✄B ∧ ✷C)∗.
Proof. For some A ∈ ES2 and arbitrary B and C, we consider some realization
∗ and let α := A∗, β := B∗ and γ := C∗. We reason in PRA and assume
α✄PRA β. As α is Σ2(PRA), we get by (1) that
∀x ✷PRA(α→ ✸PRA,xβ). (2)
We now consider n large enough (dependent on γ) such that
✷PRA(✷PRAγ → ✷PRA,n✷PRAγ). (3)
From general observations we have that, for large enough n,
✷PRA,n(δ → ¬ǫ) ∧✷PRA,nδ → ✷PRA,n¬ǫ,
whence
✸PRA,nǫ ∧ ✷PRA,nδ → ✸PRA,n(δ ∧ ǫ) (4)
Combining (2), (3), and using (4), we see that for any n, ✷(α ∧ ✷γ →
✸PRA,n(β ∧ ✷γ)). Clearly, α ∧ ✷γ is still a Σ2(PRA)-sentence.
3 Again by (1)
we get α ∧ ✷γ ✄ β ∧ ✷γ.
Let MESn be the schema A✄B → A∧✷C✄B∧✷C with A ∈ ESn. Theorem
5.1 can be generalized using results of [1] to the theory IΣRn , which is Robinson’s
arithmetic Q plus the Σn induction rule, for n = 1, 2, 3 as follows:
Theorem 5.2. IL(IΣRn ) ⊢ M
ESn+1 for n = 1, 2, 3.
3Actually, this observation is not necessary as we use the direction in the Orey-Ha´jek
Characterization that does not rely on the reflexivity.
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6 A frame condition for B
Let us first fix some notation. If C is a finite set, we write xRC as short for∧∧
c∈C xRc. Similar conventions hold for the other relations. The A-critical
cone of x, CAx is in this section defined as C
A
x := {y | xRy∧∀z (ySxz → z 6 A)}.
By x↑ we denote the set of worlds that lie above x w.r.t. the R relation.
That is, x↑ := {y | xRy}. With ySx↑ we denote the set of those z for which
ySxz.
We will consider frames both as modal models without a valuation and as
structures for first- (or sometimes second) order logic. We say that a model M
is based on a frame F if F is precisely M with the  relation left out.
In this subsection we give the frame condition of Beklemishev’s principle.
Our frame condition holds on the class of finite frames. At first sight, the
condition might seem a bit awkward. On second sight it is just the frame
condition of M with some simulation built in. First we approximate the class
ES2 by stages.
Definition 6.1.
ES02 := BS1
ESn+1
2
:= ESn2 | ES
n+1
2
∧ ESn+1
2
| ESn+1
2
∨ ESn+1
2
| ¬(ESn2 ✄A)
It is clear that ES2 = ∪iES
i
2
. We now define some first order formulas Si(b, u)
that say that two nodes b and u in a frame look alike. The larger i is, the more
the two points look alike. We use the letter S as to hint at a simulation.
Definition 6.2.
S0(b, u) := b↑ = u↑
Sn+1(b, u) := Sn(b, u)∧
∀c (bRc→ ∃c′ (uRc′ ∧ Sn(c, c
′) ∧ c′Su↑ ⊆ cSb↑))
By induction on n we easily see that ∀n F |= Sn(b, b) for all frames F and
all b∈F . For i ≥ 1 the relation Si(b, u) is in general not symmetric. However it
is not hard to see that the Si are transitive and reflexive.
Lemma 6.3. Let F be a model. For all n we have the following. If F |= Sn(b, u),
then b  A⇒ u  A for all A∈ESn2.
Proof. We proceed by induction on n. If n=0, A∈ES02 can be written as∨∨
i(✷Ai ∧
∧∧
j ✸Aij). Clearly, if b↑ = u↑ then b  A⇒ u  A.
Now consider A∈ESn+1
2
and b and u such that F |= Sn+1(b, u). We can write
A =
∨∨
i
(Ai0 ∧
∧∧
j 6=0
¬(Aij ✄Bij)),
with Aij in ES
n
2. If b  A, then for some i, b  Ai0 ∧
∧∧
j 6=0 ¬(Aij ✄ Bij). As
Sn+1(b, u) → Sn(b, u), and by the induction hypothesis we see that u  Ai0.
So, we only need to see that u  ¬(Aij ✄ Bij) for j 6=0. As b  ¬(Aij ✄ Bij),
for some c∈C
Bij
b we have c  Aij . By Sn+1(b, u) we find a c
′ such that uRc′,
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and c′Su↑ ⊆ cSb↑ (thus cSbc
′). This guarantees that c′∈C
Bij
u . Moreover we know
that Sn(c, c
′), thus by the induction hypothesis, as c  Aij , we get that c
′
 Aij .
Consequently u  ¬(Aij ✄Bij).
Lemma 6.4. Let F be a finite frame. For all i, and any b∈F , there is a
valuation V bi on F and a formula A
b
i∈ES
i
2
such that F |= Si(b, u)⇔ u  A
b
i .
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on i. First consider the basis case, that
is, i=0. Let b↑ be given by the finite set {xj}j∈J . We define
y  pj ⇔ y=xj
y  r ⇔ bRy.
Let Ab0 be ✷r ∧
∧∧
j ✸pj. It is now obvious that u  A0 ⇔ u↑=b↑.
For the inductive step, we fix some b and reason as follows. First, let V bi
and Abi be given by the induction hypothesis such that u  A
b
i ⇔ F |= Si(b, u).
We do not specify the variables in Ai but we suppose they do not coincide with
any of the ones mentioned below. Let b↑ = {xj}j∈J . The induction hypothesis
gives us sentences Aji (no sharing of variables) and valuations V
j
i such that
F, u  A
j
i ⇔ F |= Si(xj , u).
Let {qj}j∈J be a set of fresh variables. V
b
i+1 will be V
b
i and V
j
i on the old
variables. For the {qj}j∈J we define V
b
i+1 to act as follows:
y  qj ⇔ y 6∈xjSb↑.
Moreover we define
Abi+1 := A
b
i ∧
∧∧
j
¬(Aji ✄ qj).
Now we will see that under the new valuation V bi+1,
(i) u  Abi+1 ⇒ F |= Si+1(b, u),
(ii) F |= Si+1(b, u)⇒ u  A
b
i+1.
For (i) we reason as follows. Suppose u  Abi+1. Then also u  A
b
i and thus
F |= Si(b, u). It remains to show that
F |= ∀c (bRc→ ∃c′ (uRc′ ∧ Si(c, c
′) ∧ cSbc
′ ∧ c′Su↑ ⊆ cSb↑)).
To this purpose we consider and fix some xj in b↑. As u  A
b
i+1, we get
that u  ¬(Aji ✄ qj). Thus, for some c
′ ∈C
qj
u , c′  A
j
i . Clearly c
′
 ¬qj whence
xjSbc
′. Also ∀t (c′Suy ⇒ y  ¬qj) which, by the definition of V
b
i+1 translates
to c′Su↑ ⊆ xjSb↑. Clearly also uRc
′. By c′  Aji and the induction hypothesis
we get that Si(xj , c
′). Indeed we see that F |= Si+1(b, u).
For (ii) we reason as follows. As F |= Si+1(b, u), also F |= Si(b, u) and by
the induction hypothesis, u  Abi . It remains to show that u  ¬(A
j
i ✄ qj) for
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any j. So, let us fix some j. Then, by the second part of the Si+1 requirement
we find a c′ such that
uRc′ ∧ Si(xj , c
′) ∧ xjSbc
′ ∧ c′Su↑ ⊆ xjSb↑.
Now, uRc′ ∧ xjSbc
′ ∧ c′Su↑ ⊆ xjSb↑ gives us that c
′ ∈C
qj
u . By Si(xj , c
′) and the
induction hypothesis we get that c′  Aji . Thus indeed u  ¬(A
j
i ✄ qj).
Note that in the proof of this lemma, we have only used conjunctions to
construct the formulas Abi .
Definition 6.5. For every i we define the frame condition Ci to be
∀ a, b (aRb→ ∃u (bSau ∧ Si(b, u) ∧ ∀ d, e (uSadRe→ bRe))).
Lemma 6.6. Let F be a finite frame. For all i, we have that
for all A∈ESi2, F |= A✄B → A ∧ ✷C ✄B ∧ ✷C,
if and only if
F |= Ci.
Proof. First suppose that F |= Ci and that a  A✄B for some A∈ES
i
2
and some
valuation on F . We will show that a  A ∧✷C ✄B ∧ ✷C for any C. Consider
therefore some b with aRb and b  A ∧ ✷C. The Ci condition provides us with
a u such that
bSau ∧ Si(b, u) ∧ ∀ d, e (uSadRe→ bRe) (∗)
As F |= Si(b, u), we get by Lemma 6.3 that u  A. Thus, as aRu and a  A✄B,
we know that there is some d with uSad and d  B. If now dRe, by (∗), also bRe
and hence e  C. Thus, d  B∧✷C. Clearly bSad and thus a  A∧✷C✄B∧✷C.
For the opposite direction we reason as follows. Suppose that F 6|= Ci. Thus,
we can find a, b with
aRb ∧ ∀u (bSau ∧ Si(b, u)→ ∃ d, e (uSadRe ∧ ¬bRe)) (∗∗).
By Lemma 6.4 we can find a valuation V bi and a sentence A
b
i∈ES
i
2
such that
u  Abi ⇔ F |= Si(b, u). Let q and s be fresh variables. Moreover, let D be the
following set.
D := {d∈F | bSadRe ∧ ¬bRe for some e }.
We define a valuation V that is an extension of V bi by stipulating that
y  q ↔ (y∈D) ∨ ¬(bSay),
y  s ↔ bRy.
We now see that
(i) a  Abi ✄ q,
(ii) a  ¬(Abi ∧ ✷s✄ q ∧✷s).
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For (i) we reason as follows. Suppose that aRb′ and b′  Abi . If ¬(bSab
′), b′  q
and we are done. So, we consider the case in which bSab
′. As Si(b, b
′), (∗∗) now
yields us a d∈D such that b′Sad. Clearly bSad and thus, by definition, d  q.
To see (ii) we notice that b  Abi ∧ ✷s. But if bSay and y  q, by definition
y∈D and thus y  ¬✷s. Thus b∈Cq∧✷sa and a  ¬(Ai ∧ ✷s✄ q ∧ ✷s).
The following theorem is now an immediate corollary of the above reasoning.
Theorem 6.7. A finite frame F validates all instances of Beklemishev’s prin-
ciple if and only if ∀i F |= Ci.
Definition 6.8. Let Bi be the principle A✄B → A∧✷C✄B∧✷C for A ∈ ES
i
2
.
Corollary 6.9. For a finite frame we have F |= Bi ⇔ F |= Ci.
For the class of finite frames, we can get rid of the universal quantification in
the frame condition of Beklemishev’s principle. Remember that depth(x), the
depth of a point x, is the length of the longest chain of R-successors starting in
x.
Lemma 6.10. If Sn(x, x
′), then depth(x) = depth(x′).
Proof. Sn(x, x
′)⇒ S0(x, x
′)⇒ x↑ = x′↑.
Lemma 6.11. If Sn(x, x
′) & depth(x) ≤ n, then Sm(x, x
′) for all m.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on n. For n = 0, the result is clear. So, we
consider some x, x′ with Sn+1(x, x
′) & depth(x) ≤ n+1. We are done if we can
show Sm+1(x, x
′) for m ≥ n+ 1.
This, we prove by a subsidiary induction on m. The basis is trivial. For the
inductive step, we assume Sm(x, x
′) for some m ≥ n + 1 and set out to prove
Sm+1(x, x
′), that is
Sm(x, x
′) ∧ ∀y (xRy → ∃y′ (ySxy
′ ∧ Sm(y, y
′) ∧ y′Sx′↑ ⊆ ySx↑))
The first conjunct is precisely the induction hypothesis. For the second conjunct
we reason as follows. As m ≥ n+ 1, certainly Sn+1(x, x
′). We consider y with
xRy. By Sn+1(x, x
′), we find a y′ with
ySxy
′ ∧ Sn(y, y
′) ∧ y′Sx′↑ ⊆ ySx↑.
As xRy and depth(x) ≤ n+1, we see depth(y) ≤ n. Hence by the main induction,
we get that Sm(y, y
′) and we are done.
Definition 6.12. A B-simulation on a frame is a binary relation S for which
the following holds.
1. S(x, x′)→ x↑ = x′↑
2. S(x, x′) & xRy → ∃y′(ySxy
′ ∧ S(y, y′) ∧ y′Sx′↑ ⊆ ySx↑)
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If F is a finite frame that satisfies Ci for all i, we can consider
⋂
i∈ω Si. This
will certainly be a B-simulation.
Definition 6.13. The frame condition CB is defined as follows. F |= CB if and
only if there is a B-simulation S on F such that for all x and y,
xRy → ∃y′(ySxy
′ ∧ S(y, y′) ∧ ∀d, e (y′SxdRe→ yRd)).
An immediate consequence of Lemma 6.11 is the following theorem.
Theorem 6.14. For F a finite frame, we have
F |= B ⇔ F |= CB.
Note that the M-frame condition can be seen as a special case of the frame
condition of B: we demand that S be the identity relation.
It is not hard to see that the frame condition of M0 follows from C0. And
indeed, ILB ⊢ M0 as ✸A ∈ ES2 and A✄ B → ✸A✄B. Actually, we have that
ILB1 ⊢ M0.
7 Beklemishev and Zambella
Zambella proved in [18] a fact concerning Π1-consequences of theories with a Π2
axiomatization. As we shall see, his result has some repercussions on the study
of the interpretability logic of PRA.
Lemma 7.1 (Zambella). Let T and S be two theories axiomatized by Π2-
axioms. If T and S have the same Π1-consequences then T + S has no more
Π1-consequences than T or S.
In [18], Zambella gave a model-theoretic proof of this lemma. As was sketched
by G. Mints (see [3]), also a finitary proof based on Herbrand’s theorem can be
given. This proof can certainly be formalized in the presence of the superexpo-
nentiation function, thus it yields a principle for the Π1-conservativity logic of
Π2-axiomatized theories. We denote it here as Z(EP
c
2).
Z(EPc2) (A ≡Π1 B)→ A✄Π1 A ∧B for A and B in EP
c
2.
where the class EPc
2
of modal formulas is defined as follows:
EPc2 ::= ✷A | ¬✷A | EP
c
2 ∧ EP
c
2 | EP
c
2 ∨ EP
c
2 | A✄A.
The class EPc2 is of course tailored so that any arithmetical realization will be
provably Π2. Note that the superscript c is there to indicate that the ✄modality
is to be interpreted as a formalization of the notion of Π1 conservativity. It is
not hard to see that the formalization of this notion is itself Π2. Moreover, note
that this class coincides in extension with the earlier defined class ES3.
Since PRA is Π2 axiomatized and proves totality of the supexp function the
principle Z(EP)
c
2 applies to PRA.
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But there are repercussions for the interpretability logic of PRA as well. We
know that for reflexive theories Π1-conservativity coincides with interpretability.
We also know that any Σ2-extension of PRA is reflexive (Lemma 2.1). Alto-
gether this means that a statement α✄ β and α✄Π1 β are equivalent if α is in
Σ2 and PRA+ α is Π2-axiomatized, i.e. α is in ∆2.
We arrive at Zambella’s principle for interpretability logic:
Z (A ≡ B)→ A✄A ∧B for A and B in BS1
For the Π1-conservativity logic of PRA, the principle Z(EP
c
2
) is really informative
(see [3]), it is the only principle known on top of the basic ones for the Π1-
conservativity logic of PRA. The principle Z for interpretability logic is very
interesting as well but it does turn out to be derivable in ILB as we will now
proceed to show. (See however the final remark of this section.)
Here modal logic again proves to be informative - to have such a proof
is interesting since it is not at all clear to us how the two principles relate
arithmetically.
We shall give a purely syntactical proof of ILB0 ⊢ Z, B0 being a restriction
of B to BS1 formulas, see Definition 6.8. The proof in [10] of the same fact was
not correct.
Throughout the proof we consider a full disjunctive normal form of modal
formulas:
Definition 7.2. A full disjunctive normal form (a full DNF) over a finite set
of formulas {C1, . . . , Cn} is a disjunction of conjunctions of the form ±C1 ∧
. . .∧±Cn where +Ci means Ci and −Ci means ¬Ci, i.e., each Ci occurs either
positively or negatively in each disjunct.
Each propositional formula is clearly equivalent to a formula in full DNF
over the set of propositional atoms occurring in it. Similarly each modal BS1-
formula, being a boolean combination of boxed formulas, is equivalent to a
formula in full DNF over the set of its boxed subformulas, or even over any
finite set of boxed formulas containing its boxed subformulas (or just its boxed
subforumulas maximal w.r.t. box-depth).
Theorem 7.3. ILB0 ⊢ Z
Proof. Let A,B ∈ BS1 and let {A1, . . . , Am} be the set of boxed subformulas of
both A and B. Assume w.l.o.g. that A and B are in full DNF over {A1, . . . , Am}.
Assume A ≡ B. We show that A ✄ A ∧ B. Since A comes in full DNF, this
means to show, for each disjunct D of A, that D✄A∧B. In fact, we show this
for any disjunct of A or B.
A disjunct D of either A or B is fully determined by the set D✷ of boxed
formulas occurring positively in it. We shall write D✷ also for the conjunction
of its members.
We first show, if D is a member of A or B which has a maximal set D✷ (no
disjunct E with E✷ properly containing D✷ occurs in A or B) then D✄A∧B:
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Suppose such D is in A, the other case is symmetrical. Since D ✄ A we
have also D✄B. Then, noting that D✷ is a conjunction of boxed formulas and
applying B0, we obtain D ✄B ∧D
✷.
Now take any disjunct E of B for which E✷ does not contain D✷. Then
E contradicts D✷ by its negative part. We distinguish two cases: if for all E
in B the set E✷ does not contain D✷, then B contradicts D✷. It follows from
D ✄B ∧D✷ that D ✄⊥. Then clearly D ✄A ∧B.
Otherwise B does contain E with E✷ containing D✷. But since D has a
maximal Box-set, E and D must be the same and D occurs in B as well. Thus
D ✄B ∧D and, since ⊢ D → A, also D ✄A ∧B.
We have shown that all maximal disjuncts interpret A ∧B.
We show by induction that the same is true for all other disjuncts of A and B.
This suffices for the proof.
Assume that, for all k′ with m ≥ k′ > k and all disjuncts D in either A
or B with D✷ of size k′, D ✄ A ∧ B (this has already been shown for k equal
to the size of the maximal Box-set in A and in B which is certainly less then
m). Consider a disjunct D of A, the other case is again symmetrical. Assume
w.l.o.g. that D✷ has size k. We have to show D ✄A ∧B:
Since D✄A and hence D✄B, we again have that D✄B∧D✷. Now D✷ conflicts
with all the disjuncts of B, Box-set of which is not a superset of D✷. Again, we
distinguish two cases: if there are no disjuncts of B with a Box-set which is a
superset of D✷ then B conflicts with D✷ and D ✄⊥ and thus D ✄A ∧B.
Otherwise some disjuncts of B do have a Box-set which is a superset of
D✷. Let E1, . . . , El be all such disjuncts of B. Then, since D ✄ B ∧ D
✷ and
⊢ B ∧D✷ → E1 ∨ . . . ∨ El (where E1 ∨ . . . ∨ El is the part of B not conflicting
with D✷), we obtain D ✄ E1 ∨ . . . ∨ El. Now it suffices to show that each Ei
interprets A ∧B.
Fix an Ei and suppose E
✷
i have size k. But then Ei = D and thus we have,
as before, D✄ (B ∧D)✄ (B ∧A). If E✷i have size greater then k, the induction
hypothesis apply and we obtain that Ei interprets A ∧B.
Actually it is possible to extend Zambella’s principle somewhat in such a way
that it is no longer clear whether the result is still derivable from B. First note
that the formulas in ES2 are just the propositional combinations of ✷-formulas.
Zambella’s principle for interpretability logic as studied in this paper reads
A ≡ B → A✄A ∧B
where A and B should both be BS1. However, to have access to the ideas behind
Zambella’s principle, it is sufficient that A and B be both provably of complexity
∆2. We can thus look at those ES2 formulae who are provably equivalent to the
negation of some other ES2 formula and plug those formulae in. Reflecting this
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thought in a formula yields4
✷((A↔ A′) ∧ (B ↔ B′))→ (A ≡ B → A✄A ∧B)
where A, A′, B and B′ are all from ES2. It actually makes sense to call this
principle the Zambella principle for interpretability logic as it more precisely
reflects the arithmetical ingredients. We have chosen not to do so as to be
consistent with earlier papers.
8 Delimitation of IL(PRA)
Let us see what we can conclude about IL(PRA) from the above. Certainly
IL(PRA) includes IL(All) but it is more than that because B is not a principle
of IL(All). The latter is clear from the fact that IL(All) ⊆ ILM∩ ILP and Z is
not in ILP: consider the following model:
w
p q
Sw
We have w  ✸p ≡ ✸q and w 1 p ✄ p ∧ q, thus Zambella fails. The model is
clearly an ILP model.
This shows, by derivability of Z from B, that indeed B is not a principle of
IL(All).
Also we know that IL(PRA) is not ILM since M is not in IL(PRA), as A.
Visser discusses in [17]: the two logics cannot be the same because if ILM is
a part of the interpretability logic of a theory then it is a part of the inter-
pretability logic of any of its finite extensions as well. This cannot be the case
for PRA because not all of its finite extensions are reflexive. A more specific
example of a principle of ILM which is not in IL(PRA) can be given:
A✄✸B → ✷(A✄✸B).
That this formula is not in IL(PRA) can be shown using Shavrukov’s result
from [14] about complexity of the set {ψ|ψ ∈ Π1 & φ✄ ψ}; see [17] for the full
proof.
We know that M0 is provable in ILB. The other principles surely contained
in IL(PRA) are B, R and W (R∗ is the conjunction of R and W). Let us show
they are mutually independent. Note that for nonderivability proofs soundness
suffices.
4We would like to thank one of the referees for pointing out that our original extension of
Zambella’s principle for interpetability logic could actually be even generalized to its current
form.
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First let us recall the frame conditions for the two principles W and R.
The condition for W requires that the composition (Sw;R) is conversely well-
founded, the condition for R is the following: xRyRzSxuRv ⇒ zSyv.
W vs. B: It is easy to see that W 0 B since the former is in IL(All) while
the later is not in it. Since R is in IL(All) as well, W,R 0 B. The following
frame
w
x
y
z
Sw
is an ILB frame and it violates the frame condition for W: wRxRy and
xSwySwx and wRz. Now z is bi-similar to y and B is ensured. Thus
B 0 W.
Moreover, the same frame, being an R frame, shows that B,R 0 W:
the only case to check is wRxRySwxRy. Now the condition for R re-
quires ySxy, but this is clearly the case since Sx is reflexive over x.
R vs. B: Again, since R ∈ IL(All), it cannot be that R ⊢ B. We have already
discussed that neither R,W ⊢ B. The following frame
x
z′
y
z u
v
Sx
is an ILB-frame violating the frame condition of R: We have a basic
situation violating R, which is xRyRzSxuRv and ¬zSyv. To ensure B for
y we add an arrow yRv, to ensure B for z, we add a bi-similar world z′
such that xRz′ and z′ has no successors at all.
Moreover, since the frame is clearly a W frame as well, we have shown
that B,W 0 R.
R vs. W: already discussed in [8].
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It is clear from our exposition that, though we have solved a number of
problems concerning IL(PRA), many remain open, e.g. those connected with
our incomplete knowledge of IL(All). Also, we lack a modal completeness theo-
rem for ILB. Unfortunately, the complexity of the frame condition for B makes
this seem an intractable problem at the present time. In any case, the logic of
interpetability is far from being a finished subject.
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